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II. DiscRETE LEGAL ISSUES THAT AFFECT THE DETENTION RATE

PRE-N17IAL HEARING DETENTION: ARE THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES
INTAKE FOLLOWING THE LAW?
Henry A. Escoto
INTRODUCTION

Scene One.
In the predawn hours of a December morning in Washington, D.C., police
officers stopped a middle-aged, white woman on suspicion of drunk driving. The
officer handcuffed the woman to the leg of a mailbox. The temperature outside
was nearfreezing. The police forced the woman to sit handcuffed to the mailbox
for approximately 20 minutes. The incident became front page news.1 The Mayor
said the incident reflects the lack of training in the police department.2
The Chiefof Police ordered an investigation and promised to personally review
the investigation.3 A police official said: "if the allegations are true, the two
4
arresting officers violated the department's policies governing" the arrest.
Scene Two.
The next day, a police officer handcuffed an African-American teenager to the
same mailbox. The officer seized the child for a routine delinquency matter. The
child posed neither a danger nor a risk to the community or others, and according
to the law, the police or social services should have released the child to his
parents. However, the police referred the child to the Receiving Home where he
was forced to spend the night in detention.
This child is not alone. Six or seven young children are illegally detained at the
Receiving Home each night. Thousands of children have been detained unlawfully
1. Serge F. Kovalesld, D.C. Police Handcuff Motorist To Mailbox: Department To Probe DrunkDriving Arrest, Media Altercation, vAsH PosT, Dec. 19, 1993, at Al.
2. Paul Duggan, Kelly Faults Training of Police: Georgetown Arrest Called Troubling,' WASIL PoMT,
Dec. 22, 1993, at Bi.
3. Tracy Thompson, Chief to Review Handcuffing Incident: Thomas Orders Im'estlgatlon of Arrest.
Altercation with Reporter, WASH. Post, Dec. 20, 1993. at B3.
4. Kovaleski, supra note 1.
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every year. This has been happening for a long time, but has gone unnoticed; there
is no public outcry. The Washington Post does not print stories to remind us of
their plight or their liberty interests. The Mayor does not denounce their unlawful
detentions and decry the lack of police training. The Chief of Police does not
personally promise to review the department's policy regarding the pre-initial
hearing detention of children eligible for release. No one speaks out for the
children's dignity.
This Note will examine the different pre-initial hearing detention standards
applied by superior court judges in the District of Columbia, intake workers from
the court's Social Services division, and the Metropolitan Police Department
(MPD).5 Furthermore, this Note will argue that the pre-initial hearing detention
standards should be strictly adhered to and uniformly applied.
By statute, Congress required the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to
adopt a set of rules governing the pre-initial hearing detention of juveniles. 0
However, the MPD's guidelines and the Social Services intake practices have
never conformed to the superior court rules mandated by Congress.7
Juvenile justice reformers have long blamed the different detention standards
employed by the police, social services intake workers, and judges for contributing
to unnecessary and discriminatory juvenile detentions at the Receiving Home for
Children (Receiving Home).' As the overnight detention facility for juveniles, the

5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(a) (1989 Repl.) requires a next-day detention hearing (excluding
Sundays) when a child is taken into custody and not released to a parent as required by § 16-2311. At the
initial hearing, the judge hears from both parties and determines whether the child should be "placed or
continued in detention or shelter care under the criteria in section 16-2310." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(e)
(1989 Repl.).
6. Pub. L. No. 358, 84 Stat. 529 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN § 16-2310(c) (1989 Rcpl.)); see also
Juvenile Court Proceedings, 1969: Hearingson S. 2981 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1926-28 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; see generally Stanton Darling I, Youth
Offenders and Neglected Children Under the D.C. Crime Act, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 373, 419-21 (1970-71);
Mary C. Lawton, Juvenile Proceedings-TheNew Look, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 342, 359 (1970-71).
7. See discussion infra section II.
8.

See REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 668 (1966)

[hereinafter D.C. CRIME COMMISSION] ("The excessive use of the Receiving Home is attributable, in part, to
the division of responsibility for admissions among the Juvenile Court, Metropolitan Police Department, and
the Department of Public Welfare"); REPORT

OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT SYSTEM STUDY

COMMITTEE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR preparedfor the Senate Subcomm. on Govt. Efficiency and
the District of Columbia of the Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1983) (police, Social

Services, and judges use deterrence as a factor in their pre-initial hearing detention decisions) [hereinafter
D.C. COURT SYSTEM STUDY]. The D.C. Bar established the D.C. Court System Study Committee in 1978 to
study the effect of the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 and to recommend
improvements in the D.C. court system. The Committee prepared a Child Neglect and Juvenile Delinquency
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Receiving Home9 has been criticized for many years because of its overcrowding
and deplorable conditions."'
The legislative history of the juvenile court reorganization"

indicates that

Congress was concerned with reducing the number of unnecessary overnight
detentions at the Receiving Home, improving detention facilities, and revising

juvenile detention procedures.1 2 To reduce the number of unnecessary pre-initial
hearing detentions, Congress intended for the court to draft uniform detention
standards that would govern detention decisions made by the MPD, Social
Services, and superior court judges.' 3
This intention is evident from the verbal exchange which took place between

Report from its study. See also Patricia Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles, in PRsUtisNG Jts'rcC FOR
aE CHILD 119, 121 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976) ("Interim detention. despite its breity, contributes
enormously to overcrowding at detention facilities.").
9. Until recently the Youth Services Administration used the Receiving Home for ov.ernight. pre-initial
hearing detentions. However, on August 17, 1995, Superior Court Judge George W. Mitchell found the
Receiving Home inappropriate to temporarily house children and ordered it closed. Nancy Lenis. D.C. Judge
Orders Shutdown of Children's Receiving Home: Facility Called 'Unacceptable for a Civtli:ed Country',
WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1995, at B1.
10. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1990) (class of detained and
committed children alleging constitutional and statutory violations for failure of D.C. detention facilities.
including the Receiving Home, to provide "care, rehabilitation, and treatment"); In re Savoy. 98 Daily Wash.
L. Rptr. 1937 (D.C. Super. Ct., Oct 30, 1970) (Savoy 1)and In re Savoy. 101 Daily Wash. L Rcptr 317
(D.C. Super. Ct., Feb. 20, 1973) (Savoy 11)(holding that Receiving Home was not a suitable place of
detention because it failed to provide "custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should have been given him by his parents" as required by statute and thus refraining from ordering or
authorizing detention at the Receiving Home); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (plaintiff
alleging, among other things, that Receiving Home failed to provide needed psychiatric assistance); DC
CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 727 ("[E]quipped to handle 90 juveniles, [the Receiving Home) is now
regularly crowded with up to 200 children .... This overcrowding is seriously affecting the quality of the
program at the facility."); Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1760 (prepared statement by Sen. Mathias,
noting that "[tihe Receiving Home is presently grossly overcrowded; designed for 90, it held 178 youths last
week, and the staff is understandably fearful of a riot"). See also Nancy Le is, Standing Room Only at D.C.
Youth Centers: Lawyers for Juveniles Want New Cty Fines;, WAsH PosT., Apr. 8, 1994, at AI (Receiving
Home is overcrowded and youths arrested overnight are "held in police cellblocks because there (is no] space
for them to sleep, even sitting up").
11. For further information about reorganization of D.C. juvenile proceedings, see generally Darling.
supra note 6; Lawton, supra note 6.
12. Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia said in a
prepared statement: "[t]he legislation before us today addresses the abominable conditions %%hich presently
exist for handling dangerous juvenile offenders in this city." Senate Hearings supra note 6. at 1759. Sen.
Charles Mathias, Jr., a member of the committee, added "[wle might well question the advisability of
detention on a policy basis, but if there is going to be detention, there must be adequate facilities and
services." Id. at 1760.
13. See infra pp. 198-203.
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Senator Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman of the Committee on the District of
Columbia, and Honorable Morris Miller, Chief Judge of the D.C. Juvenile
Court: 4
The CHAIRMAN. I am also concerned about the percentage of juveniles that
are detained overnight and then released the next day. Is there any reason
why 35 percent of the police admissions to detention could not be screened out
without having to wait 24 hours?
Judge MILLER. I cannot explain the entire figure, but there are many cases
where the police refer to the receiving home for want of any adult to release
the child to for the next detention hearing day.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it your feeling that the reason the 35 percent were held by
the intake was because they did not have a parent?
Judge MILLER. I would not say that; no. I would say that would be a large
number of those who are ultimately released.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you specifically sat down with the police department to
try and work out procedures to reduce that number? . .. Have you come up
with any procedure to reduce that number?

Judge MILLER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not? Certainly, you are not happy with it, are you?
The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about modernizing and reforming your
procedure, so that 35 percent of the children are not unnecessarily held who
would normally be released.
Judge MILLER. That is not our procedure, Senator. The police send them to
the receiving home. I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, the procedure is going to be guided by you. You
are the chief judge of the juvenile court. You are certainly involved in the
present Commission on Criminal Justice? . . . They mandated you to do
something about it. . . . [W]e ask you to sit down with the Department of
Public Welfare and with the police, to try and improve the procedures.

14.

Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 1926-27.
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Judge MILLER. The only way of improving the procedure, Senator, is to
modify their standards. 15
With the goal of improving juvenile pre-initial hearing detentions and reducing
unnecessary overcrowding at the Receiving Home, Congress enacted a law' 0 to
provide consistent pre-initial hearing detention standards applicable to all persons
who take juveniles into custody. 17 Congress required the superior court to develop
rules governing the detention criteria of juveniles. This requirement was consistent
with the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia's earlier
recommendations that the Juvenile Court "assume exclusive responsibility" for
developing pre-initial hearing detention standards. 8
Despite the fact that the law requires that standards be consistent, the MPD
and Social Service exercise different pre-initial hearing detention standards.' 0 Preinitial hearing detention decisions of the MPD and Social Services should be
governed by D.C. Code Section 16-231020 and Superior Court Juvenile Rule 106.21
Despite a clear and unambiguous statutory enumeration of the appropriate
detention criteria, the MPD, Social Services and superior court judges consistently
fail to apply the correct criteria.
By statute, the MPD must adopt detention standards consistent with the law. 2

15. Senate Hearings, supranote 6, at 1926-27. Sen. Tydings went on to express his dissatisfaction with
the court's and police department's inability to reduce overnight detentions: "I cannot believe that the 35
percent who were not responsible for a crime cannot be reduced. I know we have inefficiency, but I cannot
believe we are this inefficient." Id. at 1928.
16. Pub. L. No. 358, 84 Stat. 529 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN § 16-2310(c) (1989 Repl.)).
17. Senate Hearings,supra note 6,at 1826. (Department of Justice Staff Mcm. on Proposed Cede of
Juvenile Procedure for the District of Columbia (S.2981)) (criteria for detaining children "apply to all
custody decisions whether by the court, a law enforcement officer, or social service personnel").
18. D.C. CRIME CossMsSIoN, supra note 8. at 668. The Commission stated:
We agree with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency that "ultimate responsibility for
detention rests with the court, which must take the initiative for developing sound and consistent
intake policies." Experience in other cities demonstrates that the exercise of firm control by the
Juvenile Court is not only practicable but also successful in reducing the number of admissions to a
detention facility.
Id.
19. See discussion infra sections II and III, respectively, on the police department's and social servtc'
intake pre-initial hearing detention criteria.
20. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310 (1989 Repl.) (criteria for detaining children).
21. D.C. SUPER. CT.Juv. R_ 106 (as amended, Aug. 1. 1995).
22. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-115 (Supp. 1994) (mayor must enforce all laws and ordinances pertaining
to the police department); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A, § 800.3 (1988) (police chief must promulgate rules and
regulations according to District law).
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However, the MPD has not done so. Instead, the MPD has retained the same
juvenile pre-initial hearing detention criteria in place since the early 1960s.2 3 The
discrepancy between the considerable number of children the MPD and Social
Services detain overnight before their initial hearings and the considerably smaller
number of children Social Services recommends for detention at the outset of the
initial hearing demonstrates that the MPD and Social Services ignore the statute
and court rule and thus are unlawfully detaining children before their initial
hearings.
I.

THE LAW GOVERNING JUVENILE DETENTION

A. Section 16-2310 and Rule 106 Govern Detention Decisions Made by Police
and Social Services Intake.
D.C. Code Section 16-23 10 governs the pre-initial hearing detention of juveniles
in the District of Columbia. 4 Section 16-2310(a) provides that:
A child shall not be placed in detention prior to a factfinding hearing or a
dispositional hearing unless he is alleged to be delinquent or in need of
supervision and unless it appears from available information that detention is
required -

(1) to protect the person or property of others or of the child, or
(2) to secure the child's presence at the next court hearing.
Section 16-2310(c) provides that: "The criteria for detention and shelter care
. ..as implemented by rules of the Superior Court, shall govern the decisions of
all persons responsible for determining whether detention or shelter care is
warranted prior to a factfinding hearing." 25 Section 16-2310(c) clearly mandates
that Rule 106 govern all pre-initial hearing detentions. 28 The phrase "all persons"
23. See discussion infra section II.
24. Pub. L. No. 358, 84 Stat. 529 (1973) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(c) (1989)); Senate
hearings, supra note 6, at 1826. See Darling II, supra note 6, at 420; Lawton, supra note 6, at 359.
25. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106 cmt. ("This Rule is adopted pursuant to the statutory direction in D.C.
Code § 16-2310(c) and (b) ....")
26. Id. See, e.g., Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 64-65 (D.C. 1980).
The primary and general rule of statutory construction is ...the intent of the lawmaker [which
is] found in the language that he has used .... Where the language is plain and admits of no more
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is not limited to judges but includes any individual responsible for detaining a
27
child before an initial hearing (i.e., the MPD and Social Services intake).
Additionally, the statute uses the word "judge" elsewhere to specifically designate

judges.2 The only persons who may take a child into custody and detain him or
29
her are police officers, social services intake staff, and judges.

The superior court adopted Rule 106 to conform with Section 16-2310.30
Adhering to the detention criteria outlined in Section 16-2310, the court deemed
as relevant a set of factors that judges, the MPD, and Social Services must
consider in making detention decisions.3"
The court provided that in deciding whether detention is necessary to protect the

person of others, the decision-maker must consider the following factors:
(i) Record
(ii) Record
(iii) Nature
(iv) Nature

of the respondent's previous offenses against persons,
of the respondent's previous weapons offenses,
and circumstances of the pending charge,
and circumstances of other pending charges, if they involve an

offense against the person or a weapons offense,

(v)
(vi)

Allegations of danger or threats to witnesses, and
32
Emotional character and mental condition of the respondent.

The court also provided that in deciding whether detention is necessary to
protect the property of others from serious loss or damage, the following factors

must be considered:

than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion ....
Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary
appear, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to
them. . . . In other words, the language being plain, and not leading to absurd or %holly
impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Kleiboemer v. United States, 458 A.2d 731, 737 (D.C. 1983) (wherc statute
is clear on its face and the parties have not persuaded the court that the language of the statute admits no
more than its original meaning, the statute is applied as written) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (917); 2A SUTHERLANDr. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRLCrTON § 46.01 (1973)).
27. See discussion infra section I.B.
28. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312 (1989 Repl.).
29. Id. § 16-2311(a)-(c).
30. See supra note 25.
31. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a). The version of Rule 106 discussed in this Note is as amended in
August, 1995.
32. Id. R. 106(a)(1).
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(i) Record of respondent's previous offenses against the property of others,
if serious loss or damage was involved,
(ii) Nature and circumstances of the pending charge, and
(iii) Nature and circumstances of other pending charges if they involve
serious loss or damage to the property of others. 88
Furthermore, the court also provided that in deciding whether detention is
necessary to protect the child's own person, the following factors are relevant:
(i) Narcotics addiction by respondent or other indication of illegal drug
use,

(ii) Abuse of alcohol by the respondent,
(iii) Suicidal actions or tendencies of the respondent, and
(iv) Other seriously self-destructive behavior creating an imminent danger
34
to the respondent's life or health.
Finally, the court also established a set of relevant factors for considering
detention to secure a child's presence at the next court hearing. 8 These factors
are:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

The respondent's residence in the District of Columbia,
Length of respondent's residence and present community ties,
Employment and school record of the respondent,
Record of respondent's appearances at prior court hearings and
circumstances surrounding non-appearances, if any,
(v) Record of respondent's previous abscondences from institutions or
official custody, and circumstances surrounding such abscondences,
(vi) Record of respondent's abscondences from home, and circumstances
surrounding such abscondences and the respondent's eventual return
home, and
(vii) Seriousness of the pending charge and its likelihood of inducing nonappearance.
33.
34.
35.

Id. R. 106(a)(2).
Id. R. 106(a)(3).
Id. R. 106(a)(4).
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Even if detention appears to be justified pursuant to the factors listed above, the
court can also consider the child's living arrangement and degree of supervision if
they justify the child's release before adjudication."
Although the court established a set of factors that a decision-maker must
consider before detaining a child, the court also required immediate pre-initial
hearing detention for children "charged with homicide, forcible rape, robbery
while armed, attempt to commit any such offense, assault with intent to commit
any such offense, or burglary in the 1st degree, or who is in abscondence from
Court-ordered secure detention.""7
The court also prohibited the detention of a child charged with being a person in
need of supervision, except upon order of a judge, "unless it appears from available
information that immediate detention is necessary to protect the child's own person
under the criteria listed in subsection (a)(3) of this Rule." 3 8
After an arrest, the MPD Youth Division and the Social Services Division of the
superior court may detain a child pending a detention hearing.30 At the Youth
Division, the officer may either refer the case to court or close the case.' 0 If the
officer refers the case, the child may be released and told to report within two days
to Social Services for an intake interview. 41 If the officer refers the child to court
and does not release the child, the officer brings the child to the Receiving Home
for a next-day detention hearing."2 At the Receiving Home, a Social Services
intake worker reviews the need for detention.' 3 The child must be released unless
detention is required as provided in Section 16-2310 and Rule 106."
At the initial hearing, the judge may order the child released or detained. 0 If
the judge finds that detention is required, then a probable cause hearing is held. "'
36. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R 106(a)(5).
37. Id. R. 106(a)(6).
38. Id. R. 106(a)(7).
39.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311 (1989 Repl.).

40. See id. § 16-2311(a); Handling Juveniles, MPD Gen. Order 305.1 18 (1990) [hereinafter Gen.
Order 305.1]. See generally WALLACE J. MLYNIEC & JOHN M. COPACINO. JUVENiLE LAw & P.ACTICE IN
THE DisTRIcT OF COLUMBIA 2-15 (1988).
41. MLYNIEC & COPACINO, supra note 40, at 2-15.
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311(a)(1989 Repl.). See also Gen. Order 305.1. supra note 40, at 14 and
MLYNIEC & COPACINO, supra note 40, at 2-15. While this Note was in the final stages of publication, the
Youth Services Administration, by order of the Presiding Judge of the Family Division of the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, permanently closed the Receiving Home.
43. D.C CODE ANN. § 16-2311(b) (1989 Repl.).
44. Id. § 16-2310(a), (c).
45. Id. § 16-2312.
46. Id. § 16-2312(e).
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Probable cause is a prerequisite for detention. 47 If the judge determines that there
is probable cause to detain the child, the judge may or may not release the child
depending on whether detention is required under Section 16-2310 and Rule 106. 48
If there is no probable cause to detain, the judge must order the child released. 4
B.

Section 16-2311 Requires Application of Section 16-2310 and Rule 106(a).

Section 16-2311 (a) provides that any person who takes a child into custody must
"with all reasonable speed," 50 do one of three things: (1) release the child to a
parent upon a promise to bring the child before the court as requested unless
detention appears necessary as provided in Section 16-2310; (2) take the child to
the Director of Social Services; or (3) take the child to a medical facility if prompt
treatment or diagnosis for medical or evidentiary purposes is required. 5 '
Furthermore, the person taking the child into custody must give prompt notice to
Corporation Counsel and to the child's parent,52 along with the grounds for taking
53
the child into custody.
"Persons," as used within the statute refers to law enforcement officers and

Social Services intake workers because both have the power to detain children. 5 '
Law enforcement officers also are authorized by statute to take children into

47. Id. § 16-2312(e)-(f).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(d) (1989 Repl.).
49. Id. § 16-2312(0.
50. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated in dicta that detention of a juvenile for
several hours following his arrest did not violate § 16-2311 (a) requiring police to release a child to his parents
or bring him before the Director of Social Services after his arrest. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d
948, 957 n.21 (D.C. 1980) ("The police here had not yet reached the point in their processing ... at which
that determination had to be made. [Respondent] was held only for several hours, and the officers did not fail
to return him to his family 'with all reasonable speed' as required by § 16-2311.").
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311(a)(1)-(3) (1989 Repl.). See also Darling, supra note 6, at 420.
52. While "guardians," "custodians," and "parents" have separate legal definitions under §16-2301(12),
for the purpose of clarity "parent," as used within this Note, includes guardians or custodians unless stated
otherwise.
53. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311(a) (1989 Repl.).
54. Id. The Director of Social Services has the "power to take into custody and place in detention or
shelter care ... children who are under his supervision as delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected, or
children who have run away from agencies or institutions to which they were committed under this
subchapter." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2337 (1989 Repl.). "Persons" also include the Chief of the Child
Protective Services Division of the Department of Human Services (the chief).
The chief may take a child into
custody upon written notification from a hospital that the child's parents have not established a parental or
custodial relationship with the child at least 10 days following the child's birth. D.C. CODE ANN, § 16-2309
(Supp. 1994).
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custody pursuant to either an arrest or a court order, provided that the law
enforcement officer reasonably believes that the child: (a) has committed a
delinquent act; (b) is in immediate danger because of his surroundings; (c) is
suffering from illness or injury and that removal from the environment is
necessary; or (d) has run away from home.e 5 Law enforcement officers refer
children whom they detain to the Receiving Home prior to the detention hearing.56
At the Receiving Home, the Social Services intake staff independently review the
need for detention.57 The Social Services intake staff must release the child to a
parent unless Rule 106 requires detention. 8
Rule 106 creates a presumption for a child's release to his or her parents unless
detention is required under the above criteria."9 As a precaution against
unnecessary detentions and subjective judgment by judges, police officers, and
Social Services intake workers, the court established a set of factors that all
0 Furthermore, any
persons responsible for detaining juveniles must consider. U
person taking a child into custody or detention must articulate the reasons for
doing so.
Section 16-2312(d)(1)(A) requires judges to articulate in writing their reasons
for ordering detention."' Rule 105 previously required that "[a]ny person who
brings a child to a shelter or detention facility shall give the Director of Social
Services or his delegate a signed report, setting forth the reasons why the child was
not released to his parents, guardian, or custodian." 6 2 This requirement was
deleted, however, when the new amendments to the Juvenile Rules took effect on
August 1, 1995.

55. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2309 (Supp. 1995); Darling, supra note 6,at 419. A child may b- taken into
custody pursuant to a court order. The court may order custody if it appears that the child may leave or be
removed from the jurisdiction or not be brought to the initial hearing. DC CODE ANN § 16-2306(c) (1989
Repl.). The court may also order custody if there are grounds for detention under Section 16-2309. Id.
Additionally, the court may order that the child be taken into custody if a parent fails to bring the child
before the court after promising to do so. D.C. CODE A%,. § 16-2311 (c).
56. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2311(a)(2) (1989 Repl.) (police officers must bring child taken into custody to
Director of Social Services at Receiving Home). See Gen. Order 305.1. supra note 40. at 14.
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311(b)(1) (1989 Repl.).
58. Id.
59. The language of Rule 106(a) requires, as a condition precedent, the presence of factors under § 162310 before any pre-initial hearing detention is made.
60.

See D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106.

61. In re M.L. DeJ., 310 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. 1973) (holding § 16-2312(d)(l)(A) requires judges to
articulate their reasons for ordering detention); accord In re B.P., 397 A.2d 974 (D.C. 1979) (requiring judge
to provide reasons for detaining juvenile in probation revocation hearing).
62. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 105(b).
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II. THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S DETENTION GUIDELINES, AUTHORITY, AND
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE LAW

A.

The MPD's Detention Criteriafor Juveniles

The MPD has established guidelines for determining whether a juvenile should
be referred to court. Despite the fact that Rule 106 and Section 16-2310 govern
detention by police officers, the MPD's detention guidelines are not in accordance
with either the statute or the rule.
The police department's detention criteria, listed in General Order 305.1,03
provide that:
Youth Services and Youth Division officers shall avoid placing juveniles in the
Receiving Home, if possible, and shall only consider detention when one of the
following conditions exists:
(1) The parent(s), guardian, or custodian cannot be located after a diligent
84
effort to do so;
(2) It is reasonably assumed that the parent(s), guardian or custodian will
not or cannot produce the juvenile before the Family Division when
required;
(3) The juvenile constitutes a serious threat to his/her own welfare or the
public safety based on present and past offenses;
(4) There is a strong reason to believe that the juvenile may be harmed by
others if released; or
(5) Juveniles over the age of 13 years, charged with distribution or possession
with the intent to distribute illegal drugs, and/or possession of a
firearm.6 5

63. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14.
64. But see Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Human Services, Superior
Court Social Services Division, and the Public Defender Service, 2-115 (Nov. 14, 1984) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Understanding] (on file with the District of Columbia Law Review). The above named
agencies agreed to remedy potential overcrowding at the Receiving Home. The Memorandum provides that
screening and review for pre-initial hearing detention should be conducted pursuant to § 16-2310 and Rule
106. Id. It also provides alternatives to detention if a parent cannot be contacted or located. Id. at 2-117.
65. There is no comparable provision under Rule 106(a) for this provision. Rule 106(a) does not make
any distinctions between the age of the child and the offense with which the Corporation Counsel charges the
child.
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Perhaps it is ironic that the police department's detention criteria are essentially
the same as they were in 1966 when the D.C. Crime Commission reported its
findings.6 6 The commission recommended that the MPD revise its detention
guidelines according to the written criteria of the juvenile court.0 7 However, MPD
still operates under standards that are essentially the same as before the law

changed. Moreover, it has resisted making changes despite the recommendations
of the Crime Commission and the statutory mandate that it follow the superior
court pre-initial hearing trial detention procedures.
The MPD's regulation calls for detention of a juvenile if a parent cannot be
located after diligent effort."" This provision is not found in Section 16-2310(a) or
Rule 106(a). Both this Section and the rule permit detention only to: (a) protect
persons, property or the child, or (b) to secure the presence of the child at the next

court hearing, but only as provided in Rule 106(a).69 If the child is eligible for
release, but a parent cannot be contacted or located, a more appropriate option is
provided in the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
Human Services, Superior Court Social Services Division, and the Public Defender
Service.70 The Memorandum of Understanding requires the Social Services intake
66. D.C. CRusIE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 639. The MPD's detention guidelines proidc for referral
to the Receiving Home:
(1) When the parents, guardians or custodians cannot be located after diligent effort to do so;
(2) When it may reasonably be presumed that the parents, guardians or custodians will not or cannot
produce the juvenile before the Juvenile Court, when required;
(3) When the circumstances attending the present offense or offenses are so serious that the juvenile
constitutes a threat to his welfare and/or to the safety and protection of the public;
(4) When the juvenile's prior history, coupled with the attending circumstances of the present
offense, constitute a threat to himself and/or to the safety and protection of the public
(5) When the juvenile is destitute of a suitable home;
(6) When there is a strong reason to believe that detention is necessary as a matter of protective
custody.
Id.
67. D.C. CRIME CoMMISStON, supra note 8, at 727.
68. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14.
69. See Lawton, supra note 6, at 359. Statutory criteria prohibit detention:
[W]hen the sole basis for keeping the child in custody is the absence of some parent. guardian or
custodian to care for him. Even if delinquency is alleged, the child being kept in custody solely for
lack of someone to care for him is to be placed in shelter care, not detention.... [Furthermore], lack
of someone responsible for the child is not, alone, grounds for keeping the child in custody if he is
able to care for himself. Thus, the 17 year-old with a job and a place to stay may not be held simply
because his parents are not available unless it can also be established that he cannot take care of
himself.
Id. at 359-60.
70. Memorandum of Understanding,supra note 64. at 2-115.
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workers to comply with the following procedures if the child's parent cannot be
located or contacted.
First, the intake worker should ask the child about other family members or
third-party custodians. If such individuals are available, then the intake worker
must contact the individual and determine whether she is a suitable third-party
custodian. If the intake worker determines that the home is suitable for the child's
placement pending the initial hearing, the intake worker must take the child to the
third-party custodian's residence.7 1 Second, if no suitable third-party custodian is
available, then suitable agencies, such as foster and shelter homes, must be
contacted for placement pending the initial court hearing.7 2 The above procedure is
more appropriate and consistent with parental care and custody than the care
73
provided by the MPD and Social Services.
The MPD allows an officer to detain a juvenile if the officer "reasonably
assume[s]" that a parent cannot ensure the juvenile's appearance before the court
when required.7 4 This policy calls for police officers to subjectively decide the
credibility of the child's parent, thus giving police officers considerable discretion
not found within Sections 16-2310, 16-2311, or Rule 106.
Section 16-2311 only requires the person taking a child into custody to release
the child to the parent upon the parent's promise to bring the child to court when
requested.7 5 Furthermore, Rule 106(a)(4) establishes a set of relevant factors for
considering detention to secure a child's presence at the next court hearing.70
Neither the rule nor the statute requires police officers to second-guess a parent's
promise to bring the child to court when requested.
The MPD's detention guidelines further provide that an officer may detain a
child if "[t]he juvenile constitutes a serious threat to his/her own welfare or the
public safety based on present and past offenses. ' 77 This provision is too broad
because it does not provide a standard from which to determine "serious threats"
to the child's welfare7 8 or public safety 79 as provided within Rule 106. In addition,
71. Memorandum of Understanding,supra note 64, at 2-115.
72. Memorandum of Understanding,supra note 64, at 2-115.
73. See Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv, R. 2.
74. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14.
75. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2311 (a)(1) (1989 Repl.).
76. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(4); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14.
78. But see D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(3) (providing relevant factors to detain to protect child's
own person).
79. But see D.C. SUPER. CT. Jt;v. R. 106(a)(1)-(2) (providing relevant factors to detain to protect the
person or property of others).
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Rules 106(a)(1) and 106(a)(3) already contain sets of factors to decide whether
detention is required to protect the child or public safety. 0
The MPD detention criteria further give a police officer the discretion to detain
a juvenile if the officer has "a strong reason to believe that the juvenile may be
harmed by others if released." 81 This particular provision is not found within Rule
106(a) or Section 16-2310(a).82 Rule 106(a)(3) sets out pertinent factors for the
detention of children to protect their own person, 8a but none of the factors in the
Rules provides for detention solely because the child may be harmed by others.
Detention based on probable harm by others is unlawful and unjust. In essence, a
child is penalized for the criminal acts of others.
The MPD General Order provides for the detention of juveniles over the age of
13 charged with the distribution of illegal drugs or possession with the intent to
distribute illegal drugs, and/or possession of a firearm."' Neither Rule 106 nor
Section 16-2310 distinguishes detention on the basis of age or charge."0 However,

80. Rule 106(a)(1) deems the following factors as relevant to protect the person of others:
(i) Record of respondent's previous offenses against persons.
(ii) Record of the respondent's previous weapons offenses,
(iii) Nature and circumstances of the pending charge,
(iv) Nature and circumstances of other pending charges, if they involve an offense against the
person or a weapons offense,
(v) Allegations of danger or threats to witnesses, and
(vi) Emotional character and mental condition of the respondent.
Id. See also In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1988) (at disposition, judge may consider implications of public
safety in determining detention).
Rule 106(a)(3) cites the following factors as relevant to protect the child's own person:
(i) Narcotics addiction by respondent or other indication of illegal drug use.
(ii) Abuse of alcohol by the respondent,
(iii) Suicidal actions or tendencies of the respondent, and
(iv) Other seriously self-destructive behavior creating an imminent danger to the respondent's life
or health.
Id. Although these factors are not exclusive, they do provide a set of factors that must be considered and
articulated before any detention decision is made.
81. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14. Contra INsrTrUrE OF JL'DICIAL ADMiNtSTRATIoN/
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO I.TsERIM STATUS. THE RELEASE. CONTROL AND

DETENTION OF ACCUSED JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DisPosmON § 5.7 (1980) (limiting
protective custody pre-initial hearing detentions where "the juvenile would be in immediate danger of serious
bodily harm if released, and the juvenile requests such custody"); Id.. cmt. at 73-74.
82. But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(b) and D.C. SUPER- CT Juv R. 106(b) (providing for detention
in shelter care to protect the person of the child).
83. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(3).
84. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14.
85. Rule 106(a)(6) requires immediate pre-initial hearing detention if the child is "charged with
homicide, forcible rape, robbery while armed, attempt to commit any such offense, assault with intent to
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Rule 106(a) does require the decision-maker to consider all of the factors deemed
relevant for detention and to articulate the reasons for detention. 0
Rule 106(a)(5) provides another factor not considered by officers in making
detention decisions. This subsection provides that: "[i]f detention appears to be
justified . . . the person making the detention decision may nevertheless consider

whether the child's living arrangements and degree of supervision might justify
'87
release pending adjudication.
B. Police Department's Authority to Promulgate Regulations Regarding
Detention
The D.C. Council empowered the Mayor with the authority to enforce "[a]ll...
rules and regulations for the proper government, conduct, discipline, and good
name of [the] Metropolitan Police Force ... "88 As the Chief Executive Officer of
the MPD, the Chief of Police is authorized to "promulgate all [general] orders,
rules and regulations of the Mayor or the Council which pertain to the work of the
Metropolitan Police Department."8 8 Moreover all orders, rules or regulations
promulgated by the chief must be implemented according to law and D.C.
government policy. 0
The police department does not have rulemaking powers. As an agency of the
District of Columbia, it is authorized to "adopt regulations to carry into effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this,
but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity."'91
The Chief of Police promulgated General Order 305.1 for the purpose of
establishing "the policy and procedures for handling juveniles who come into
commit any such offense, or burglary in the 1st degree, or who is in abscondence from Court-ordcred secure
detention." Id.
General Order 305.1 cites Rule 106 as requiring referral to court of juveniles charged with any of the
above offenses. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 14. This is the only reference to Rule 106 within the
General Order.
86. Section 16-2311(a)(4) provides in part: "[a]ny person taking a child into custody shall give prompt
notice to the Corporation Counsel and to the parent, guardian, or custodian (if known) together with the
reasons for custody." Id.
87. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(5).
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-117 (1992 Repl.); see also id. § 4-115 (empowering the Mayor with duty of
enforcing laws and ordinances applicable to the MPD).
89. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A, § 800.3 (1988).
90. Id.
91. District of Columbia v. Jones, 287 A.2d 816, 818 (D.C. 1972) (citing Dixon v. United States, 381
U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
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contact with members of the [police] department." 92 As a procedural or policy
statement, General Order 305.1 does not have the force or effect of Section 162310 or Rule 106,9a and, in any event, is inconsistent with both." Despite MPD's
policy to avoid placing juveniles in the Receiving Home, the General Order gives
police officers greater discretion to detain juveniles than that given to Social
Services intake workers or superior court judges.95

m.

SOCIAL SERVICES DIVISION DETENTION CRITERIA

Social Services provides juvenile "intake procedures, counseling, education and
training programs, probation services" and other services mandated by the
superior court.96 The Director screens all complaints against children alleged to be
delinquent and conducts preliminary inquiries to determine whether the best
interest of the child or the public requires filing a petition. 7
At the Receiving Home, a Social Services intake worker reviews "the need for
detention or shelter care prior to the child's admission to the place of detention or
shelter care." ' s Section 16-2311(b) requires that Social Services release the child
to a parent unless the intake worker "finds that detention or shelter care is
required under Section 16-2310.' '
A.

Social Services Detention Criteria Do Not Follow Superior Court Rule
106.

Like the MPD, Social Services also does not follow the statutory mandate under
Section 16-2310(c) that Rule 106 "govern[s] the decisions of all persons
responsible for determining whether detention . . . is warranted prior to the

92. Gen. Order 305.1. supra note 40. at 1.
procedurem, like
93. Wanzer v. District of Columbia. 580 A.2d 127, 133 (D.C. 1990) (-[Agcncy
agency manuals, do not have force or effect of statute or administrative regulation.... Rather, they pro.ide
officials with guidance on how they should perform those duties which are mandated by statute or
regulation.").
94. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A, § 800.3 (1988).
95. Gen. Order 305.1, supra note 40, at 4.
96. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1722(a) (1989 Repl.).
97. Id. § 16-2305(a).
98. Id.§ 16-2311(b)(1).
99. Id.
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factfinding hearing." 1 ' Social Services's detention criteria provide for detention of
juveniles if no less restrictive alternatives are available that would reduce the risk
of flight or of serious harm to other persons or to the property of others.101 Social
Services's less restrictive alternatives include: (1) third-party placement with a
child's relative, other parent or a close friend of the family; (2) home detention; 10 2
or (3) youth shelter house.' 03 Alternative placement is provided if it is the child's
first contact with the court, or the child does not meet the criteria governing secure
detention. 0
B.

Social Services Defies Not Only Section 16-2310 and Rule 106 But its
Own Rules as Well.

Social Services detention criteria seem consistent with the presumption of
release under Section 16-2310 and Rule 106. However, factual evidence shows
that Social Services is not following its own policy of releasing juveniles as
provided within its own guidelines or Rule 106.
During a one month period in 1995, Social Services detained overnight 153
(83%) of 180 juveniles prior to the initial hearing.100 At the next-day initial
hearing, Social Services recommended release for 105 out of the 153 (68%)

100. Id. § 16-2310(c).
101. D.C. Super. Ct. Social Service Div. Manual 2.15 to 2.17 (1995) [hereinafter Social Service
Division Manual]. Social Services detention criteria provide for the detention of juveniles if they are:
(I) fugitives from another jurisdiction; (2) on conditional release or shelter care in connection with
two previous delinquency proceedings, including probation and consent decree; (3) in abscondence
from shelter care twice while awaiting trial or other disposition; and (4) charged with a serious
property crime or a crime of violence, or for selling illegal drugs, which would amount to a felony if
committed by an adult and the juvenile is (a) already detained or on conditional release or shelter
care from another delinquency proceeding, including probation and consent decree; (b) has a record
of failing to appear in court; (c) has a record of violence resulting in physical injury to others; (d)
has a record of adjudications for serious property offenses; or (e) a record of adjudications for the
sale of narcotics.
Id.
102. Under home detention, the juvenile is sent home where his behavior, curfew, and adjustments at
home and school are monitored by a staff member of the Department of Human Services Youth Services
Administration.
103. A youth shelter house is a community-based group home. Supervision is provided by counselors
working for private providers under contract with the Department of Human Services. The juvenile attends
school or works during the day and returns to the home in the evening. The juvenile is allowed home visits on
the weekend if the juvenile abides by the rules and regulations of the shelter house.
104. Social Service Division Manual, supra note 101, at 2.17.
105. See infra Appendix B, at 455, 458.
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juveniles detained overnight.'"6 Hence, in 105 cases, Social Services workers
recommended release after the initial hearing for children under the Rule 106
criteria whom they were required to release under the same criteria the night
before the initial hearing.
The discrepancy between the number of juveniles Social Services intake detains
overnight and the number it recommends for release or to non-secured facilities at
next-day detention hearings is overwhelming. Given these figures, it is fair to
conclude that Social Services does not follow its detention guidelines or Rule 106.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted Section 16-2310 for the purpose of reducing unnecessary and
discriminatory detentions of juveniles. Furthermore, it mandated that the superior
court rules governed the detention criteria used by police officers, Social Services
intake workers, and judges. However, the MPD has yet to issue guidelines
consistent with Section 16-2310 or Rule 106. Social Services's detention guidelines
are more restrictive than that required by Rule 106 and, in any case, are not
consistently applied.
The superior court has the power to enforce its court rules. However, the court
has been reluctant to exercise that power when it comes to the detention practices
of the MPD and Social Services. The superior court should adhere to the will of
Congress and enforce Section 16-2310 and Rule 106. Enforcement of the statute
and the Rule would ensure consistency in the pre-initial hearing detention criteria
of the police department and Social Services intake. It would also ensure
conformity with public policy and the law.

106. See infra Appendix B, at 454.

